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MENS REA REQUIREMENTS UNDER CERCLA:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE DIRECTORS,
OFFICERS, AND EMPLOYEES
America has produced an environmental disaster. American
industry has dumped hazardous wastes1 for many years, with no
concern for the quality of the method implemented. According to
one study, "of the 77.1 billion pounds of hazardous waste generated
annually in the United States, only 10% are disposed of in a safe
manner."2 Improperly disposed hazardous substances3 have left
our ecosystem in serious peril.
Concern and appreciation for the need to protect the environ-
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (herein-
after "CERCLA") adopts the definition of "hazardous waste" from RCRA which is codified
at 42 U.S.C.A. § 6903(5) (West's 1983 & Supp. 1989):
The term "hazardous waste" means a solid waste, or combination of solid
wastes, which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or
infectious characteristics may-
(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an
increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the
environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or
otherwise managed.
(Note: The coverage of CERCLA is not limited to hazardous wastes as defined under
RCRA, it also includes hazardous substances.)
2. C. Dubuc & W. Evans, United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical
Co., Inc.: The Eighth Circuit Unleashes a CERCLA Dragnet on Corporate Officials, 24 ToRT
& INs. L.J. 168-69 (1988).
3. CERCLA defines "hazardous substances" as defined in 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 (14)
(West's 1983 & Supp. 1989):
The term "hazardous substance" means (A) any substance designated
pursuant to section 1321 (b)(2)(A) of Title 33, (B) any element, compound,
mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title,
(C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under or listed
pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6921]
(but not including any waste the regulation of which under the Solid Waste
Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6901 et seq.] has been suspended by Act of Con-
gress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any
hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42
U.S.C.A. § 7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or
mixture with respect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to
section 2606 of Title 15. The term does not include petroleum, including crude
oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or desig-
nated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this
paragraph, and the term does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liq-
uefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas
and such synthetic gas).
The term "hazardous waste" will be used interchangeably in this paper with the term
"hazardous substance."
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ment was heightened in the late 1960's.4 In the early 1970's, the
Love Canal tragedy5 focused national attention on the damage that
occurs from exposure to hazardous substances. Contamination of
the environment by hazardous waste occurs either by direct dump-
ing or by improper methods of disposing of the substances. The
health effects may be short-term or long-term. Exposure to hazard-
ous wastes can cause cancer, genetic mutation, birth defects, mis-
carriages, and damage to the lungs, the liver, the kidneys, and the
nervous system.6
I. OVERVIEW OF CERCLA
In order to respond to the heightened concern over the con-
tamination of the environment, Congress passed the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (1980)
(hereinafter "CERCLA").7 This Act was passed not only to pre-
vent harm caused from exposure to hazardous wastes, but to rectify
many years of unchecked improper waste disposal procedures as
well.
CERCLA's first function is to clean up inactive or orphaned
sites which are leaking hazardous substances before further damage
occurs. The Act's second function is to create an emergency re-
sponse system to clean up serious spills of hazardous substances.8
There are two approaches to the enforcement of CERCLA.
The main thrust of the statute is civil enforcement.9 In addition to
the civil approach, criminal sanctions were included in CERCLA in
order to address the serious threats posed by attempts to avoid the
civil enforcement of CERCLA after contamination occurs. 10 Spe-
cifically, these criminal sanctions are imposed to deter polluters
from failing to notify the Environmental Protection Agency (here-
4. See generally F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER, & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY (1984).
5. See generally V. Stanley, Establishing Liability For the Damages From Hazardous
Wastes: An Alternative Route for Love Canal Plaintiffs, 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 273-310 (1982)
and text infra.
6. Comment, Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1462 (1986). If danger-
ous sites are not located before they have an impact on the public, these severe harms may
well occur. See United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6238, 6241 and 6249 (1976)).
7. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9657 (West's 1983 &
Supp. 1989). CERCLA is also commonly known as "Superfund" because CERCLA created
a Federal fund to cleanup the most serious hazardous waste sites.
8. United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D.C. Colo. 1985).
9. The criminal sanctions are designed only to ensure reporting to facilitate CERCLA.
See analysis infra.
10. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9603(b) - (d).
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inafter "EPA") of actual and potential leaks of hazardous sub-
stances. When leaks are not revealed to the EPA, CERCLA's
purpose is frustrated because the danger will not be discovered until
the hazards affect both the environment, and public health and
welfare. 11
CERCLA's reporting feature is premised on the assumption
that the EPA will be able to identify hazardous waste sites before
those sites endanger the public health and welfare.12 Consequently,
the EPA relies on mandatory reporting, by both past and present
owners and operators, specifying the location of hazardous waste
sites and the types of wastes stored at those sites. In addition to
owners and operators, individuals who are in charge of facilities at
which a release of a hazardous substance occurs must immediately
report the release to the government.
Because this information is essential to the safeguarding of the
public, CERCLA provides for criminal sanctions against owners,
operators, and persons in charge of facilities who fail to comply
with the statute by not reporting. No court has interpreted how
these sanctions will be applied. In order to predict how a court will
interpret criminal provisions of CERCLA, analysis of these provi-
sions is necessary.
In this article, we will focus on the criminal aspects of CER-
CLA's enforcement as it applies to directors, officers, and employ-
ees of corporations who dispose of hazardous materials. We will
analyze what mens rea requirements will be applied to CERCLA's
criminal enforcement provisions based upon the Supreme Court's
interpretations of similar statutes. Additionally, we intend to pro-
pose a method to strengthen the deterrence value of these sanctions
to effectuate the goals of CERCLA.
II. CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT UNDER CERCLA
A. Actions Giving Rise to Criminal Punishment
There are several actions which constitute a violation of CER-
CLA and are punishable criminally. First, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9603(a)13
makes it mandatory to notify the National Response Center, estab-
lished under the Clean Water Act, 4 whenever any "release"' 5 of a
11. See United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6238, 6241 and 6249 (1976)).
12. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 n.2 (1982).
13. All code sections are 42 U.S.C.A. unless stated otherwise.
14. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251 - 1387 (West's 1986 & Supp. 1989).
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toxic or hazardous substance exceeding federal standards occurs. 6
The party in charge of the "vessel"' 7 or "facility,"' 8 as defined
under CERCLA, is responsible for "immediately" notifying the
government as soon as that person has knowledge of a release. Fail-
ure to do so is criminally punishable under section 9603(b) by fines
or up to three years imprisonment for a first offense and five years
for a second offense.
Second, there is a penalty for false reporting of hazardous spills
or leaks. If a "person in charge"'19 of a site' 0 where a spill has oc-
curred knowingly reports false or misleading information to the Na-
tional Response Center, that person is subject to the same penalties
as if the spill was not reported or was concealed.
Third, section 9603(c) requires that any person who owned a
disposal site at the time of disposal of a hazardous substance, or
who now owns a disposal site, is obligated to report that site to
EPA. A disposal site is one which has stored, treated, or disposed
of hazardous substances as defined under the Act. Failure to report
the site is punishable by a $10,000 fine or not more than one year in
prison, or both.
15. The term "release" means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting,
emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing
into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels,
containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or
pollutant or contaminant) but excludes (A) any release which results in expo-
sure to persons solely within a workplace, with respect to a claim which such
persons may assert against the employer of such persons, (B) emissions from
the engine exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, aircraft, vessel, or pipeline
pumping station engine, (C) release of source, byproduct, or special nuclear
material from a nuclear incident....
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(22) (West's 1986 & Supp. 1989).
16. The National Response Center would then notify all relevant agencies depending on
the facts of each situation.
17. " he term 'vessel' means every description of watercraft or other artificial contri-
vance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water." 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 9601 (28).
18. The term "facility" means (A) any building, structure, installation, equip-
ment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treat-
ment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage
container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where
a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or
otherwise come to be located; but does not include any consumer product in
consumer use or any vessel.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(9) (West's 1983 & Supp. 1989). The definition of "facility" is very broad.
It includes the "true" facility where hazardous substances are being disposed in containers or
in landfill and it has been applied to the relatively minor instance of a road-side spill. United
States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 895 (D.C. N.C. 1985).
19. See text infra.
20. We use the term "site" interchangeably with the terms "vessel" and "facility."
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Finally, individuals required to report disposal sites under sec-
tion 9603(c) are also required to keep specific records on those sites
under section 9603(d). These records must be held for fifty years
after the site is reported. A person who attempts to destroy,
change, or conceal these records may be fined or imprisoned for up
to three years for a first offense or five years for a second offense.
B. Exposure of Corporate Directors, Officers, and Employees
to Liability Under Section 9603(b).
We must determine who may be found liable for carrying out
the above actions. If a corporation violates the Act, are directors,
officers, and employees sheltered from liability by the corporation if
they are the ones who carried out the acts?
In United States v. Carr,21 the Second Circuit addressed who is
liable as a "person in charge" under section 9603(b) for failure to
report a release. In this case, the foreman of a paint disposal crew
was convicted for failing to report a release to the National Re-
sponse Center. The foreman argued he was not in a significant posi-
tion of authority to be considered a person in charge. The court
ruled that a "person in charge" could include anyone on the contin-
uum from corporate directors to employees responsible for the op-
erations. The court stated:
Indeed, as the Fifth Circuit has stated, "to the extent that legisla-
tive history does shed light on the meaning of 'persons in charge,'
it suggests at the very most that Congress intended the provisions
of [section 311] to extend, not to every person who might have
knowledge of [a release] (mere employees, for example), but only
to persons who occupy positions of responsibility and power."
[citation omitted]....
The reporting requirements of the two statutes do not apply
only to owners and operators [citation omitted], but instead ex-
tend to any person who is "responsible for the operation" of a
facility from which there is a release [citations omitted].22
Thus, the Second Circuit in Carr has found that anyone with a
sufficient level of responsibility may be found liable under section
9603(b).
21. 880 F.2d 1550 (2d Cir. 1989).
22. Id. at 1554.
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C. Exposure of Corporate Directors, Officers, and Employees
to Liability Under Sections 9603(c) and (d).
The phrase defining liability in section 9603(c) and (d) states
that an "owner or operator" who fails to report or keep records on
a site can be criminally liable. Courts have not interpreted "owner
or operator" in the criminal context, but the phrase has been inter-
preted by several courts construing civil liability under the Act.
A major factor in determining whether the owner is liable is
the amount of control that the owner has over the disposal of haz-
ardous waste on the property. In State of Idaho v. Bunker Hill
Co.,23 the court held that the parent corporation of a subsidiary,
which owned a hazardous substance site, was an owner under CER-
CLA. The court felt that the parent corporation had substantial
knowledge of hazardous waste disposal and releases at the subsidi-
ary.24 The criteria upon which the court relied in reaching its deci-
sion was the parent corporation's decision-making authority and
ability to undertake actions to prevent the resulting damage caused
by the disposal and releases of hazardous wastes.25
In State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp. ,26 the court ad-
dressed the issue of whether an officer would be liable as an opera-
tor. The corporation was formed solely to purchase property which
contained a hazardous waste disposal site. The corporation was
controlled by the defendant. He was the sole director and stock-
holder. Not only was he fully aware of violations on the property,
but he permitted them to continue. Because of the defendant's ex-
clusive authority over the corporation and the egregious facts, the
court held the defendant to be personally liable as an "operator."'27
An example of the court's readiness to extend liability to cor-
porate employees is apparent in United States v. Northeastern Phar-
maceutical.28 In this case, the Eighth Circuit imposed civil liability
against a plant supervisor of a corporation which was found to be a
generator of toxic wastes. The defendant argued he could not be
held personally liable because he did not own or possess the sub-
stances which were improperly disposed of. The court disagreed by
focusing on the language of the statute which states "any person"
who arranged for disposal or transportation of hazardous sub-
23. 635 F. Supp. 665 (D.C. Idaho 1986).
24. Id. at 672.
25. Id.
26. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
27. I at 1052.
28. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cerL denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1988).
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stances is liable.29 The court believed that if Congress wanted direc-
tors, officers, and employees to be sheltered from liability, Congress
would have used the phrase "person" and defined it narrowly. 30
The court felt the congressional use of "any person" closed the
loophole that would have been created if directors, officers, and em-
ployees were not held liable.31
The phrase "owner or operator" defined by the above courts
may be applied to sections 9603(c) and (d) which state that "any
person who owns or operates" a facility is criminally liable for fail-
ure to comply with these sections. As with civil liability, the statu-
tory focus is once again on "any person." Under the Northeastern
Pharmaceutical analysis, if a plant supervisor is held liable, then
directors and corporate officers will also be liable.32 Thus, accord-
ing to the above interpretations, corporate directors, officers, and
employees in positions of responsibility have been held to be civilly
liable under CERCLA. Given the foregoing construction of civil
liability under CERCLA, and in the absence of any judicial deci-
sions regarding criminal liability under section 9603, it is logical to
conclude that the same individuals held civilly liable will also be
criminally liable.
D. The Judicial Approach to the Mens Rea Requirements
The remainder of this article will address the issue of what
mens rea is required by the Act. Because there is little case law
interpreting CERCLA's criminal sanctions, we analyze how similar
federal environmental statutes have been interpreted by the courts
and how the courts will interpret the criminal sanctions of CER-
CLA. Finally, we will make suggestions for the future to
strengthen the criminal enforcement of these provisions. Our sug-
gestions are intended to increase the deterrence value of the crimi-
nal sanctions and make the application of these penalties against
corporate directors, officers and employees comply with traditional
notions of fairness.
29. Id at 743.
30. Id
31. Id. For further analysis of civil liability under CERCLA, see G. O'Hara, Minimiz-
ing Exposure To Environmental Liabilities for Corporate Officers, Directors, Shareholders, and
Successors, 6 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 5 (1990).
32. "Moreover, construction of CERCLA to impose liability upon only the corporation
and not the individual corporate officers and employees who are responsible for making cor-
porate decisions about the handling and disposal of hazardous substances would open an
enormous, and clearly unintended, loophole in the statutory scheme." Northeastern Pharma-
ceutical, 810 F.2d at 743.
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1. The Public Welfare Statute Theory
CERCLA creates criminal sanctions which were not developed
by the common law. It is unclear from the language of the Act
whether these sanctions require a "guilty mind" to punish a viola-
tor. The Supreme Court has developed an analytic framework
which will allow the enforcement of criminal penalties on a strict
liability basis when law regulates activities which harm the public
health and welfare.33 Since CERCLA regulates activity which can
be extremely injurious to the public health, it must be determined if
CERCLA is a public welfare statute and if so, what effect that sta-
tus has on the common law requirement of a guilty mind before
punishment.
The Judiciary has long been faced with interpreting the appli-
cation of statutes passed by Congress which create "new" crimes,
ones not developed at common law, such as the CERCLA's crimi-
nal sanctions. The common law approach to any crime includes
both the prohibited action and the requirement that the perpetrator
have a guilty mind.34 The prohibited action is known as the actus
reus and the guilty mind as the mens rea requirement.35 A difficulty
arises when Congress creates crimes which, on their face, do not
require a guilty mind. The courts traditionally have tried to inter-
pret these new crimes to fit within with the more familiar common
law analysis and approach to crime. 36 But this can create problems.
Courts may be left attempting to read mens rea requirements into
statutes which cannot reasonably be read to have such
requirements.
Faced with this reality, but desiring to reconcile common law
requirements with the new congressional statutes, the courts have
developed a theory in an attempt to explain this discrepancy.
Courts have recognized the new statutes as a class of laws which
Congress has created to address behavior which can seriously harm
the public health, safety, and welfare.3 7 These statutes are known
33. For an extensive analysis of the history and development of the public welfare stat-
ute theory, see R. Webber, Element Analysis Applied to Environmental Crimes: What Did
They Know and When Did They Know It?, 16 B.C. ENVTL. L. Rnv. 53 (1988).
34. The "guilty mind" requirement is a standard which generally requires more than
negligence and at its most stringent level requires that the actor specifically intend to commit
the crime. See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 613 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
35. "Actus Reus: A wrongful deed which renders the actor criminally liable if com-
bined with mens rea; a guilty mind." BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 34 (5th ed. 1979).
"Mens Rea: A guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal intent. Guilty
knowledge and willfullness." BLAcK's LAW DIcrnONARY 889 (5th ed. 1979).
36. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1977).
37. Webber, supra note 33, at 55 (1988).
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as public welfare statutes.38 Because violations of these statutes
have the potential to seriously harm large segments of the popula-
tion, courts have concluded that Congress intended to enforce these
penalties on a strict liability basis.39
a. The Dotterweich Case: Strict Liability for
Public Welfare Statutes
In 1943, the Supreme Court developed this strict liability the-
ory more completely in United States v. Dotterweich.4° In this case,
an individual was convicted by a lower court under a public welfare
statute for shipping adulterated and misbranded drugs. The statute
as interpreted by the Supreme Court required the defendant to
know what actions he was taking, but not that those actions were
wrongful. The Supreme Court was willing to convict despite the
lack of the guilty mind requirement based on the following analysis.
First, the statute was a public welfare statute, violation of which has
the potential to seriously harm the public. Second, the criminal en-
forcement was implemented to increase the effectiveness of the stat-
ute. Finally, the individual was in a special position of
responsibility with the power to create or prevent a public harm.41
There were other important justifications for applying strict li-
ability to individuals in public welfare statute cases. First, the indi-
vidual charged could have exercised reasonable care and avoided
the resulting harm. Second, shipping adulterated and misbranded
drugs was a misdemeanor. In misdemeanor convictions, the pen-
alty is small and the social stigma of being convicted of a felony
does not attach.42 These factors justified a stricter application of the
laws in light of the great harm that violation of these laws could
cause. However, the importance of the misdemeanor versus felony
distinction has been somewhat vitiated in the subsequent develop-
ment of the public welfare law line of cases.
b. The Freed Case: Strict Liability for Felonies
In United States v. Freed,43 the Supreme Court was willing to
38. Id.
39. Id. at 55-56. See U.S. v. Balint,258 U.S. 250 (1922).
40. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
41. "Such legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct
- awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of
acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a
public danger." Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281.
42. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1951).
43. 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
[Vol. 6
CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
apply strict liability to a felony violation of a criminal statute under
a public welfare law. In this case, the defendant was convicted of
possessing hand grenades without a permit. The case turned on the
issue of whether the defendant needed to be aware that possession
of an unregistered dangerous weapon was illegal.
The Court believed that the dangerousness of possession of
hand grenades by private individuals was as serious as the trans-
gressions in Dotterweich.44 Consequently, this statute was a candi-
date for strict liability. Additionally, the Court made it clear that
imposition of strict liability in this case was "premised on the theory
that one would hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand
grenades is not an innocent act."45 The Court imputed the knowl-
edge that the action was illegal to the defendant.
It was important for the Court to justify this imputation of
knowledge because a general rule exists against convicting an indi-
vidual of a felony without requiring a showing of a guilty mind.'
The Court overcame this hurdle by ruling that if any reasonable
person would know that the action is illegal, then any individual
may be held strictly liable for the offense.47 This reasoning would
be repeated again in later cases.
In the 1970's, Congress became more active in passing regula-
tions to protect the environment. A series of acts were passed to
control and eliminate the pollution crisis the United States suddenly
discovered it was facing. These acts all had criminal sanctions in-
corporated into them for the purpose of enhancing the effectiveness
of the acts. However, the statutes contained knowledge require-
ments which mandated that at a minimum, some level of guilty
mind must be proven by the prosecution. The Supreme Court and
lower courts, with an ironic turn of logic, now applied the public
welfare law approach to restrict the mens rea requirements of the
new statutes. What had been created to justify the absence of mens
rea requirements in earlier statutes would now be used to affirma-
tively curtail mens rea requirements which Congress included in its
environmental statutes.
44. Id. at 609 (in Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, the violation was shipping misbranded and
adulterated drugs).
45. Id.
46. United States v. O'Brien, 686 F.2d 850, 853 (1982).
47. 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971).
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a The International Minerals Case: Strict
Liability Applied Where Knowledge is
Required
In United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp.,48
the Supreme Court first addressed the issue of what level of knowl-
edge was required for violation of a public welfare statute which
specifically contained a knowledge requirement. The statute being
interpreted was part of the Transportation and Explosives Act.4 9
This statute required, on its face, a knowing violation of an Inter-
state Commerce Commission regulation promulgated pursuant to
its power with regard to the transportation of corrosive liquids.50
Despite explicit language that the violator "know" a regulation was
being violated, the Court concluded that there was no such knowl-
edge requirement.
In addressing the statute's explicit language, the Court took
the position that the language could not be read to allow iguorance
of the law as a defense. If the violator was required to know that
there was a regulation which prohibited his action, a claim of no
knowledge of the regulation or law would be an absolute defense.
The Court ruled that Congress would not overrule such a well-es-
tablished doctrine of law without an express declaration.5" Under
this analysis, there is no requirement that the violator be aware of a
specific regulation. It is sufficient that a person be aware of the facts
which constituted the violation of the regulation.52 In International
Minerals, the defendant was liable because he knew he was trans-
porting corrosive liquids and that he had no transportation permit.
Having determined this, the Court interpreted "knowingly vio-
lates" to mean knowingly engaging in an act which violates the stat-
ute.5" There are three elements of the crime involved: (1) the
shipment of the material; (2) the dangerous nature of the material;
and (3) non-compliance with the regulation requiring papers listing
the dangerous substance.54 Having decided ignorance of the law
could not be a defense, the knowing requirement of the statute
could only apply to the first two elements because knowledge of the
third element would require knowledge of the existence of the
48. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
49. Id at 567.
50. The statute stated that whoever "knowingly violates any such regulation" shall be
fined or imprisoned. Id at 559.
51. Id at 563.
52. Id at 562 - 563.
53. Id at 563.
54. Webber, supra note 33, at 64.
[Vol. 6
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regulation.55
The Court repeated part of the public welfare rationale, stating
that because of the nature of the substances being dealt with, a re-
sponsible person could be presumed to know that a regulation ex-
ists.56 This presumption was palatable because the actor was in a
position of responsibility to the public and this interpretation effec-
tuates the purpose of the statute. Both of these concerns are deter-
minative elements of the public welfare exception for mens rea
requirements.
d. The Johnson & Towers Case: A Presumption of
Knowledge Creating Strict Liability
An alternative interpretation of the mens rea required in a pub-
lie welfare statute is found in United States v. Johnson & Towers,
Inc. 17 In this case, the Third Circuit had to deal with a violation of
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (hereinafter
"RCRA").5 8 Two employees of a chemical plant were indicted for
knowingly disposing hazardous substances without a permit in vio-
lation of RCRA.59 One of the issues the court had to decide was
whether a knowing violation meant knowledge of RCRA.
In analyzing RCRA, ° the court separated the violation into
four elements: (1) disposing of materials; (2) that the materials
were hazardous; (3) that the facility did not have a permit; and (4)
that the facility was required to have a permit.61 The remaining
question was whether knowledge was required for each element, or
as in International Minerals, for only the first two.
The court recognized that the statute was explicit in its re-
quirement of knowledge, and therefore, it was necessary to find
knowledge in order to convict. The court then balanced the now
55. International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 563. See also Webber, supra note 33, at 63.
56. IdL at 565.
57. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
58. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901 et seq.
59. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 664.
60. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d) states in pertinent part:
(d) "Criminal Penalties
Any person who-
.(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified or listed under
this subchapter-
(A) without a permit under this subchapter or pursuant to title I of the
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (86 Stat. 1052)
[33 U.S.C.A. § 1411 et seq.]; or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of
such permit; ... "
61. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668.
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well-established public policy of not requiring mens rea in a public
welfare statute against Congress' specific statutory language and in-
tent.62 This balancing focused on Congress' concern about hazard-
ous wastes and the fairness of a consistent reading of the statute.
The result was a determination that "knowing" modified all four
elements of the crime.63
Well-established public policies, however, are not easily de-
feated. At the same time it granted an ignorance of the law defense
in apparent contradiction to International Minerals, the court gut-
ted the defense by creating a presumption of knowledge on which
prosecutors can rely. The court said that individuals may be prose-
cuted if they "knew or should have known that there had been no
compliance with the permit requirement of § 692 5 ." 61 It appears
that prosecutors may borrow the Supreme Court analysis on the
issue of whether an individual should have known of the existence
of regulations under public welfare laws. Under the line of public
welfare cases decided by the Supreme Court, the very nature of the
action being regulated was a reason to find that strict liability was
appropriate. Anyone dealing with an extremely dangerous product
was presumed to understand that it was regulated. The Johnson &
Towers court applied the exact same standard, but in an altered
form. Anyone working in the disposal industry will be presumed to
understand, by the very nature of its business and the substances
with which it deals, that regulations are in existence.
Not only does this analysis water down the requirement of
knowledge of the regulation, but the second element, knowledge of
the lack of a permit, is similarly affected. Who better should have
known of the existence of a permit than the individual in charge of
the disposal? Thus, the Johnson & Towers court technically im-
poses a knowledge requirement with respect to the existence of the
regulation and the permit in order to find a violation. The court
then allows the prosecution to rely on the public welfare law theory
to impute knowledge of the other elements of the crime on anyone
who knows the substance with which he deals is dangerous to the
62. Id
63. But see United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989). In Hoflin, the Ninth
Circuit came to the opposite conclusion from the Johnson & Towers court, finding no knowl-
edge of the permit process was required of violators of RCRA who dispose of hazardous
wastes without a permit in order for the violators to be convicted. The court did this based
on a plain meaning analysis, and also cited both Dotterweich and International Minerals in
applying the public welfare statute considerations to restrict the mens rea requirements. Id. at
1038. See also United States v. Hayes International Corporation, 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir.
1986).
64. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 664-65.
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public. Strict liability returns through the back door.65
e. The Liparota Case: Public Welfare Statute
Defined
In 1985, the Supreme Court defined what type of regulations
may be regarded as public welfare statutes and what mens rea re-
quirements were appropriate for those statutes. In Liparota v.
United States,66 the defendant illegally possessed food stamps in vi-
olation of the Food Stamp Act. The question at issue was whether
a person had to be aware that his possession of food stamps was a
violation of a statute, or did he merely need to know he possessed
the food stamps.67
The Court approached this issue by creating a two part test to
determine if the statute qualified as a public welfare statute. To do
so, the statute must render criminal an activity which "a reasonable
person should know is subject to stringent public regulation and
may seriously threaten the community's health or safety."' 68 If the
conduct did not meet these two requirements, the Court found that
there was no sufficient rationale to restrict the common law require-
ment of a guilty mind.69
However, conduct which does have both of these characteris-
tics falls squarely within the exception to the mens rea requirements
under the public welfare statutes. Because of the serious threat to
society, this conduct may be punished merely for commission of the
prohibited activity without requiring a guilty mind.7'
E. Interpreting the Criminal Penalties of CERCLA
The analysis of CERCLA's criminal sanctions begins with a
determination of whether it is a public welfare statute as defined in
Liparota. If it is, then a traditional statutory analysis is conducted,
interpreting the language of the statute and ascertaining the intent
of Congress. The statutory interpretation is balanced, however, by
the special public policy considerations incumbent in a public wel-
fare statute. This balancing will determine what level of mens rea is
65. For further analysis of this point see R. Milne, The Mens Rea Requirements of the
Federal Environmental Statutes; Strict Criminal Liability in Substance But Not Form, 37
BUFFALO L. R. 307 (1989).
66. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
67. Id. at 423.
68. Id at 433.
69. Id., construed in Webber, supra note 33, at 72-74.
70. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433.
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required in order to violate the crimes created by Congress in this
statute.
The criminal sanctions of CERCLA are located in section
9603. We approach section 9603 by analyzing the three subsections
which penalize non-compliance with reporting procedures.
1. Analysis of Section 9603(b)
a. The Liparota Test
We must analyze whether each subsection of CERCLA is a
public welfare statute. There are two questions under Liparota
which both need to be answered in the affirmative in order for these
subsections to be considered public welfare statutes:
1. Is the conduct regulated such that a reasonable person should
know that it is subject to stringent regulation?71 (hereinafter the
"regulation" prong).
2. Should a reasonable person know that the conduct regulated
may seriously threaten the public health or safety?72 (hereinafter
"public safety" prong).
1) The Regulation Prong
Under the analysis of International Minerals, a reasonable per-
son should have known that the transportation of corrosive liquids
was regulated. Under section 9603(b), it is required that any sub-
stantial spill or leak of a hazardous substance should be reported to
the Federal authorities. Both statutes deal with dangerous sub-
stances. But under CERCLA, the inherent danger of the situation
regulated is substantially greater. In International Minerals, the
conduct was the mere transportation of a hazardous substance
without a permit. A violation of section 9603(b) requires an actual
leak of a hazardous substance. This is an inherently more danger-
ous situation. Thus, there is a stronger inference that an individual
should know that a regulation would apply. Consequently, it must
be concluded that the answer to Liparota's first question is yes.
2) The Public Safety Prong
There is no rational argument to be made that a reasonable
person would not know that failing to report a spill or leak of a
hazardous substance would seriously threaten the public health or
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ties can be taken, and the hazard will remain. Thus, because both
prongs under the Liparota analysis have been met, this subsection
constitutes a public welfare regulation.
Both of the questions posed by Liparota to determine whether
a statute is a public welfare statute may also be framed in a more
general fashion. The issue is whether the "conduct regulated"
means the specific act prohibited, or the general activity of which
the specific act is a part. For example, is the disposal of hazardous
waste a dangerous activity which a reasonable person would under-
stand may seriously threaten the public health or safety?73 The an-
swer to this easier question is, obviously, yes. If this is the correct
framing of the "conduct regulated," then clearly all of the subsec-
tions of section 9603 will be public welfare statutes. This should be
kept in mind as an alternate approach to that which is dealt with in
detail both above and below.
b. Statutory Analysis
At the statutory analysis phase, the public policy of restricting
the mens rea requirement of the crime in order to effectuate the
goals of the statute will be balanced by interpreting congressional
intent. Section 9603(a) states in pertinent part:
Any person in charge of a vessel or an offshore or onshore facility
shall, as soon as he has knowledge of any release (other than a
federally permitted release) of a hazardous substance from such
vessel or facility in quantities equal to or greater than those de-
termined pursuant to section 9602 of this title, immediately no-
tify the National Response Center ....
Section 9603(b) states in pertinent part:
Any person [defined in (a)]... who fails to notify immediately
the appropriate agency of the United States Government as soon
as he has knowledge of such release or who submits in such a
notification any information which he knows to be false or mis-
leading shall, upon conviction, be fined in accordance with the
applicable provisions of Title 18 or imprisoned for not more than
3 years (or not more than 5 years in the case of a second or subse-
quent conviction), or both. .. .4
73. The Supreme Court has perhaps already answered this question when it stated:
"Where... dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are
involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in
possession of them or dealing with them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation."
International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 565 (1971).
74. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9603.
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It is clear from this language that Congress intended some knowl-
edge requirement. Thus, the statute is similar to the statutes in In-
ternational Minerals and Johnson & Towers. The elements of the
crime are:75 (1) the existence of a release;76 (2) the substance re-
leased is hazardous; 77 (3) the substance is defined as hazardous by
CERCLA; and (4) (a) failure to notify the appropriate authorities of
the spill; or (b) notification with false information about the spill.7"
The question is how many of these elements are modified by the
knowing requirement?
At a minimum, since Congress has required knowledge, then
the first two elements must be modified by that requirement. Since
Congress has required culpability, no one could be found guilty if
they were unaware that a spill existed or that it was hazardous.
Congress requires that an individual make a report as soon as that
person has "knowledge of such release." Thus, the defendant must
know about the release. Additionally, the word "such" in this
phrase modifies "release" and indicates that the defendant must
know that the release was hazardous. The first two elements, there-
fore, must be read to require knowledge under a plain meaning ap-
proach.79 However, this leaves unanswered whether knowledge will
be required of the second two elements.
This knowledge requirement is also consistent with the Inter-
national Minerals analysis. If the person neither knew of the spill
nor knew that the spill contained hazardous substances, that person
would have no culpability at all. However, if knowledge is also re-
quired for the third element, it would violate the concern in Inter-
national Minerals that ignorance of the law has been made a
defense. Knowledge of the fact that CERCLA defines the sub-
stance as hazardous requires knowledge of the regulation itself, and
75. We assume for the purposes of this analysis that the accused is a "person in charge"
within the definition of subsection (a). See supra notes 21 and 22 and accompanying text.
76. See definition supra note 15.
77. See definition supra note 3.
78. See United States v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447 (1 lth Cir. 1988). In Greer, the Eleventh
Circuit reviewed a case in which the elements were defined as follows:
(1) That the defendant was "in charge of" the facility as required by § 9603(a);
(2) That a release of an hazardous substance occurred;
(3) That the defendant "knew of such release;" and
(4) That the defendant "failed to immediately notify the National Response Center."
Note that the instructions given by the trial court were not challenged on appeal. Id. at 1453.
79. The traditional approach to statutory interpretation is to first look to the "plain
meaning" of the language of the statute. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S.
564, 570 (1982). "Our task is to give effect to the will of Congress, and where its will has been
expressed in reasonably plain terms, 'that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclu-
sive.'" [citation omitted].
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this should not be required in the absence of clear statutory intent
to overrule the common law rule."° This intent cannot be found in
the legislative history of CERCLA. Thus, knowledge is probably
not required to satisfy this element.
The fourth element (failure to notify the appropriate authori-
ties) probably would require knowledge, but in a limited manner.
The courts have consistently shown concern for the ability of the
prosecution to effectuate the statute.81 Less stringent mens rea re-
quirements mean easier convictions. The fourth element could be
read to implicitly require knowledge that there was no notification
as well as knowledge that such notification was required. A court
would most likely restrict the knowledge requirement here to the
fact that no notice was given to the government. For the same rea-
son that knowledge would not modify the third element, it would
not modify the second half of the fourth element. Requiring knowl-
edge that the authorities must be notified under the statute is tanta-
mount to requiring knowledge of the statute. The court would not
want to make knowledge of the law a requirement.
In the alternative, the court might use the Johnson & Towers
approach and determine that there is no sensible construction
which would limit knowledge to the first two elements of the crime.
However, the public policy requirements for a public welfare law
would allow the court to set a standard of proof of knowledge for
the final two elements which presumes that the individual in charge
of the vessel or facility in question should have known that the sub-
stance was regulated and the spill should have been reported. This
presumption leaves the defendant in essentially the same position as
if strict liability was applied. This presumption may be rebuttable.82
There is still the issue of whether the felony punishment of this
section would require that knowledge be proven for all elements of
the crime. There are two reasons why a court would probably find
that it is unnecessary to require knowledge of all elements of the
crime even though it is a felony. The Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (hereinafter "SARA")83 was signed into law in
80. But see Justice Brennan's concurrence in Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 614 - 16 (1971). Jus-
tice Brennan argues that these interpretations should turn solely on congressional intent with-
out considering the common law rule.
81. The concern is that if the court requires knowledge in every element, the prosecu-
tion will have a more difficult time proving a violation of the law. But, if no knowledge is
required, proof of violation is reduced to proving the physical acts which violate the law were
performed by the defendant.
82. No court has yet reached the issue of whether this presumption is rebuttable.
83. Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
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1986 by President Reagan in order to significantly strengthen CER-
CLA.84 Before CERCLA was amended by SARA, the offenses
were punished as misdemeanors.85 SARA elevated the penalties to
felonies without changing the knowledge requirements. Since Con-
gress is assumed to be aware of how the Courts interpret laws,
knowledge of the public welfare statute line of cases must be im-
puted to Congress. 6 This section, under the public welfare analy-
sis, would be interpreted to be a strict liability crime if punished as a
misdemeanor.8 7 Since Congress did not change the wording of the
knowledge requirement of the statute, it could not have intended
that the knowledge requirement be increased when it increased the
penalties.88
Secondly, the viability of this restriction on imposing strict lia-
bility in felony crimes is questionable in light of Freed. Recall that
the Freed court imposed strict liability for the felony of possession
of a dangerous weapon without a permit. The imposition of strict
liability was based on the court's belief that any reasonable person
would believe that possession of dangerous weapons was illegal.
This formulation is very similar to the first question of the Liparota
test, and consequently any statute which meets that test would
probably be punishable as a strict liability statute under the Freed
reasoning.
2. Analysis of Section 9603(c)
a The Liparota Test
The Liparota test to determine whether the section is a public
welfare statute appears to be met in the affirmative. Subsection (c)
requires a notification to the EPA of any toxic disposal site by an
individual who owned or operated that site when it was in
operation.
1) The Regulation Prong
The question to be asked is, is the conduct regulated such that
a reasonable person should know that it is subject to stringent
regulation?
84. H.R. Rep. No. 99, 96th Cong., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS, 2838.
85. Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
86. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978).
87. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
88. The crime was originally a misdemeanor. In increasing the penalties to a felony as a
result of SARA's enactment the knowledge requirement was not changed. This statute can
therefore be interpreted without reference to the severity of its penalties.
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The case here is directly analogous to International Minerals.
In International Minerals, the transportation of toxic substances
without a permit was found to be an activity that a reasonable per-
son should know was subject to stringent regulation. Not seeking a
permit is in essence, failure to notify the government of an activity
and failure to comply with any regulations the government might
have with regard to that activity. Thus, both statutes deal with no-
tification of the government about activities involving extremely
hazardous substances.
The major difference is that the violator under section 9603(c)
may no longer be involved in disposing of hazardous substances.
Should a reasonable person be aware that there is ongoing stringent
regulation of activities that that person carried on in the past? This
is a close question to decide. But, the court would probably focus
on the fact that the danger from this past action does not end with
the closing of the site. In fact, the danger heightens as time passes.
Additionally, a site operator would be aware of this, andthe general
public's awareness of this fact is acute. Consequently, a court
would find that a reasonable person should be aware that stringent
regulations exist.
2) The Public Safety Prong
The second Liparota question is, should a reasonable person
know that the conduct regulated may seriously threaten the public
health or safety? This question may be directed specifically at the
action regulated against; non-notification to EPA about a hazard-
ous disposal site's operation. This could seriously threaten the pub-
lic if there was a hazard of which no responsible agency was aware.
If there is no knowledge of the problem, there will be no response,
possibly until the serious danger to the public has already been real-
ized in the form of death and disease among the affected popula-
tion.8 9 Any reasonable person would understand this threat.
b. Statutory Analysis
We now turn to the statutory analysis and balancing of the
result with the public welfare statute policy considerations. Section
9603 (c) states in pertinent part:
[By early April 1981]... any person who owns or operates or
who at the time of disposal owned or operated, or who... [trans-
ported hazardous substances to such a site] ... shall ... notify
89. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency of
the existence of such facility. . .[specifying substances stored
there and any possible releases]. Any person who knowingly fails
to notify the Administrator of the existence of any such facility
shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000, or impris-
oned for not more than one year, or both. [emphasis added]9°
Congress has included a knowing requirement. The question once
again will be does this requirement of knowledge extend to all of the
elements of the crime?
The elements of the crime in section 9603(c) are:9 1 (1) the
existence of a waste disposal site; (2) the fact that hazardous sub-
stances were disposed of there; (3) the hazardous substances are
regulated by the act; and (4) failure to notify EPA of the existence
of the site. As in International Minerals and as discussed above, the
first two elements must be modified by the knowing requirement.
Having no knowledge of the existence of the waste disposal site, or
the fact that hazardous substances were disposed of there would
make an individual innocent. However, it is hard to imagine an
owner, operator, or transporter who would not be aware of what
was being stored at the site.
This leaves analysis of thethird and fourth elements. The ar-
guments are essentially identical to the arguments made above for
the third and fourth elements of section 9603(b). There will be no
knowledge requirement as to the third element since that would
amount to an ignorance of the law defense and would violate the
underlying policy of public welfare statutes.
The fourth element will have a knowledge requirement as to
the notification of EPA's administrator. But, the defendant need
not be aware that there is a requirement to notify EPA, only that
the defendant did not notify EPA. This allows for a balance be-
tween Congress' clear intent that there be a knowledge requirement
90. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9603(c).
91. In making this analysis we assume that the hypothetical individual charged with the
crime was an owner, operator, or transporter under the statute. 42 U.S.C.A § 9601(20)(A)
defines "owner or operator":
The term "owner or operator" means (i) in the case of a vessel, any person
owning, operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an
onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such
facility, and (iii) in the case of any facility, title or control of which was con-
veyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or simi-
lar means to a unit of State or local government, any person who owned,
operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately before-
hand. Such term does not include a person, who, without participating in the
management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to pro-
tect his security interest in the vessel or facility.
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in the statute, the public welfare law theory which requires that the
purpose of the statute be effectuated, and the common law theory
that ignorance of the law is no excuse.
Once again, the court might use the alternative Johnson &
Towers approach and find that knowledge modifies all four ele-
ments. But the court would then create a presumption of knowl-
edge in the actor which in effect makes the statute a strict liability
statute in its application. There is no issue regarding due process
since this is a misdemeanor which the Dotterweich Court recognized
may be enforced on a strict liability basis.
3. Analysis of Section 9603(d)
a. The Liparota test
Section 9603(d) will also be found to be a public welfare statute
under the Liparota test. This subsection requires that individuals
identified by subsection 9603(c), in addition to reporting to EPA
about a site, must keep records regarding the site in accordance
with EPA standards. These records would identify specifically the
substances that are stored at the sites and in what amounts.92 The
records must be maintained for fifty years after notifying EPA of
the site. We apply the Liparota test to this subsection.
1) The Regulation Prong
Is the conduct regulated such that a reasonable person should
know that it is subject to stringent regulation? Again the analysis
starts with a comparison to International Minerals. Here, the ac-
tion is maintenance of records about a site. This is similar to ob-
taining permits for transportation of corrosive liquids. The
transportation of hazardous substances and their storage are related
activities. It is not unreasonable to expect that because of the lon-
gevity of the hazard of storing toxic substances, as discussed above
under subsection (c), there might be ongoing regulations regarding
the maintenance of records so that a government agency is aware of
what substances are stored where. This makes this activity one
which a reasonable person would expect is subject to stringent
regulation.
2) The Public Safety Prong
The second question is should a reasonable person know that
the conduct regulated may seriously threaten the public health or
92. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9603(d)(1)(A) and (B) (West's 1983 & Supp. 1989).
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safety? The failure to maintain records which identify the chemi-
cals stored at a location can have far reaching health ramifications.
It can result in the government not being aware of the existence of
an actual or potential problem. It might create a misallocation of
resources or result in insufficient cleanups which can seriously
threaten the public health. Consequently, a reasonable person
would know that this conduct would seriously threaten the public
health or safety. Under the Liparota test, section 9603(d) is a public
welfare statute.
b. Statutory Analysis
Section 9603 (d)(2) states in pertinent part:
[Any person in (c) shall be required to maintain records describ-
ing substances stored at the site and their amounts]... it shall be
unlawful for any such person knowingly to destroy, mutilate,
erase, dispose of, conceal, or otherwise render unavailable or un-
readable orfalsify any records identified... [by the EPA]. Any
person who violates this paragraph shall, upon conviction, be
fined in accordance with the applicable provisions of Title 18 or
imprisoned for not more than 3 years (or not more than 5 years
in the case of a second or subsequent conviction), or
both.. .[emphasis added]. 93
The emphasized clause shows that Congress has included a knowl-
edge requirement. Thus, we must determine if the knowledge re-
quirement modifies all of the elements of the statute.
The elements of the crime defined by section 9603(d)(2) are:94
(1) The existence of a disposal site; (2) the disposal of hazardous
substances at that site; (3) the fact that those substances are regu-
lated under CERCLA; and (4) (a) the failure to maintain the
records; or (b) the falsification of those records. For the same rea-
sons given in the above analyses, the first two elements here will
require a showing of knowledge in order to find criminality. If the
individual does not know the site existed or that hazardous sub-
stances were deposited there, then there is no criminality. The fact
that the substances are regulated under CERCLA will not have a
knowledge requirement because of common law concerns about ig-
norance of the law as a defense and because of the public welfare
statute policy considerations.
The fourth element will require knowledge of the fact that
93. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9603 (d)(2) (West's 1983 & Supp. 1989).
94. In making this analysis we assume that the hypothetical individual charged with the
crime was an owner, operator, or transporter under the statute.
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there are no records or that the records are false. There will be no
requirement that the defendant be aware that the records must be
maintained by statute. This allows the court to effectuate the stat-
ute. It also answers the concerns about ignorance of the law as an
excuse. It is based upon the premise that no reasonable person
would believe either that destruction of the records is legal, or that
falsification of the records is legal.95
Determining whether element 4(a) will meet this test is a close
call. The court must determine that failure to maintain the records
or the destruction of the records would be considered an illegal act
by a reasonable person. Taken by themselves, these actions might
not appear to be illegal without some knowledge that there is a re-
quirement to maintain or possess the records in the first instance.
The records chronicle the type and amount of substances which are
hazardous to human health and might be the only records of such
substances. When these actions are put in their proper context, the
assumption that a reasonable person would consider these actions
illegal is valid.
The alternative element 4(b) does not have a knowledge re-
quirement. As long as the individual is aware that the records are
false, any reasonable person would understand that their mainte-
nance of the records was illegal. It is difficult to posit a scenario in
which the maintenance of false records would be valid. The only
reason to maintain such records would be to mislead someone.
Couple this with the importance of the information and the action is
clearly one which a reasonable person would know to be illegal.
The Johnson & Towers approach could also be used in this
case. This entails a finding of a knowledge requirement for all of
the elements and then allowing a presumption of knowledge be-
cause of the responsibility of the actor. In either case the result is
essentially a strict liability statute. Finally, while this section is
punishable as a felony, this will not restrict the application of strict
liability for the same reasons as are detailed above in the analysis of
section 9603(b).
Based upon this structured analysis of the subsections of sec-
tion 9603, all of the crimes defined by Congress have limited mens
rea requirements and some strict liability aspects to them. In each,
the defendant must be shown to be aware of the basic facts which
constitute the crime, but the defendant need not be aware that his
95. See discussion supra of Freed at 306.
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actions constitute a crime. As discussed below, this may potentially
convict innocent people.
F. Implications and Suggestions
The implication of the strict liability of the criminal sanctions
of CERCLA is far-reaching. Congress implemented SARA to in-
vigorate the effectiveness of CERCLA. 96 In passing SARA, the
criminal sanctions under CERCLA were increased from misde-
meanors to felonies. Congress clearly intended to increase the de-
terrence value of CERCLA.97 The felony sanctions, combined with
the application of a strict liability standard, create a strong tool for
enforcement and deterrence.
Strict liability creates a tension between the needs of society to
be protected from hazardous spills and the tradition of common law
fairness. This tension may be illustrated by a hypothetical situation
involving a corporate director or officer who should have known,
but did not know, that a spill occurred. Is this person criminally
liable? If he is, does he deserve to suffer the stigma of a felony con-
viction, the resultant loss of his job, the financial hardship of a per-
sonal fine and the humiliation of incarceration? If he is not
criminally liable, what is to prevent other directors or officers from
shielding themselves from the knowledge which may incriminate
them? With no explicit statement from Congress on its intention,
the courts are left to struggle with this issue.
The courts, in determining whether strict liability was appro-
priate for other public welfare statutes, analyzed the prohibited ac-
tions and decided that a reasonable person would not believe that
the actions taken were legal. But, this legal imputation of knowl-
edge does not mean that a reasonable person in every case will sub-
jectively understand that his actions were in fact illegal.
For example, the director or officer of a large corporation
which is involved in a toxic spill or release may be punished under
CERCLA as an operator.98 This individual may be aware that a
spill has occurred and that the chemicals are potentially hazardous.
However, this director or officer, may be insulated from actual
knowledge regarding the extent of the danger or any technical de-
tails. Yet, this individual may be punished as a felon for failing to
96. H.R. Rep. No. 99, 96th Cong., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS, 2838.
97. This can be inferred from the increase in penalties from a misdemeanor offense to a
felony offense in the criminal sanctions enacted by SARA.
98. See supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text.
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report the spill to EPA. Knowledge of the reporting requirement is
irrelevant, and the director or officer may see no need to make a
report if he only has a vague understanding of what harm may be
caused by the spill. Under the analysis of CERCLA above, strict
liability is a proper result in this case.
There must be some way to reconcile the basic fairness of re-
quiring a guilty mind for a conviction with the necessity of prevent-
ing toxic disasters. We propose that a device be developed to
provide actual notice of CERCLA's requirements to those who are
in responsible positions and are subject to conviction.
A basic requirement that officers and directors be informed of
the law should be implemented. For example, a corporation's
board of directors could be required to read and acknowledge docu-
ments which set forth their reporting obligations under CERCLA,
and clearly delineate the punishment they face for failure to com-
ply. Compliance would be a prerequisite for incorporation or for
continuation of corporate status. By this method, actual notice
would be given to those directors. Additionally, the directors might
be required to implement internal programs which inform their of-
ficers and employees of the same facts. This acknowledgement re-
quirement invalidates the criticism that directors, officers, and
employees are not aware of the regulations. It also increases the
deterrence value of the criminal sanctions by broadly disseminating
the requirements of CERCLA. This method effectuates the dual
goals of increasing the fairness of the criminal sanctions and helping
to attain a greater deterrence value at the same time.
This proposed solution has difficulties. We do not attempt to
address what exact mechanism might be used since much of corpo-
rate law is state, not federal, law. Perhaps the federal government
could create an incentive for the states to implement such policies.
Such incentive might be accomplished through an amendment to
CERCLA itself, using the power which enabled Congress to legis-
late on hazardous substances. Regardless of the mechanism used,
as long as the officials involved are informed of the regulations
which bind them when carrying on these disposal activities, the de-
terrence value of the statute will be increased and punishment of the
violating officials will be just.
This increase in deterrence will help to ensure the integrity of
the entire statutory scheme of CERCLA. By punishing responsible
individuals who fail to inform the EPA of environmental hazards
that they have created, the EPA increases the likelihood of future
polluters notifying the EPA of dangerous sites. Additionally, if this
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proposal is implemented, polluters will already be aware of the po-
tential sanctions and will realize that the EPA intends to prosecute
these cases. Without the notification to the EPA of potential
hazards, the entire purpose of CERCLA is frustrated. However, if
notification is guaranteed, CERCLA will operate as it was origi-
nally intended to protect the public health and welfare and the
environment.
III. CONCLUSION
American industry has created an environmental tragedy.
CERCLA is one of many responses to address the harms America
faces today. CERCLA's criminal penalties for failure to report re-
leases were established to ensure the reporting of hazardous sub-
stance spills upon which the operation of CERCLA depends.
Reporting is essential to make the EPA aware of hazards to the
public. Without reporting, the entire operation of the statute is
frustrated because the EPA will not be made aware of dangerous
sites. Since cleanup of hazardous sites will not occur, the public
will remain at risk.
Because reporting is integral to CERCLA, the criminal penal-
ties have been promulgated on a quasi-strict liability basis in order
to deter non-compliance with the reporting procedures. This strict
liability application raises a problem of fairness in that individuals
usually must be aware they are committing a crime before they are
punished, thereby establishing the necessary mens rea requirement.
The criminal penalty sanctions may be enforced against corporate
directors, officers, and employees. Liability for these individuals is
predicated on their level of responsibility and knowledge of hazard-
ous spills. This knowledge prerequisite does not require that the
individual know that a crime has been committed, but only needs
knowledge of the fact that a spill has occurred.
A court must balance the need of remedying hazardous sub-
stance spills with the basic fairness of requiring a criminal defend-
ant to be aware he is committing a crime. The public welfare
statute theory that the Supreme Court has developed, coupled with
the common law rejection of ignorance of the law as an excuse, have
become decisive in this balancing process. It is our contention that
courts interpreting CERCLA will use a strict liability standard to
find a violation of the Act. We have proposed a solution which
would enhance the criminal deterrence of the statute, and at the
same time, make application of the criminal sanctions fair.
We note that this solution does not begin to address all of
[Vol. 6
1991] CRIMINAL LIABIIY7 UNDER CERCLA 405
CERCLA's shortcomings. However, by focusing on the criminal
sanctions of CERCLA, we do not attempt to solve all of the current
problems. We suggested an enhancement to the Act which will al-
low the EPA to better effectuate CERCLA's goals.
Inappropriate disposal of hazardous waste poses a global prob-
lem. It is necessary for the United States to have mechanisms such
as CERCLA's criminal sanctions to meet this problem. It is time to
take a hard stance against polluters and this requires criminal sanc-
tions which are enforced on a strict liability basis.

